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Arbitration, once viewed as an undesirable alternative to litigation, has
become widely accepted as a viable and often superior cost-effective approach to
resolving disputes. In 1955, the national Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws proposed a Uniform Arbitration Act.' Currently, 35
jurisdictions have arbitration statutes patterned after the U. A.A..'
What began as an article in the Missouri Law Review entitled Recent
Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, has evolved into an annual survey
of recent developments in case law interpreting state versions of the U.A.A.'
This detailed update monitors the underlying principles and rationales that develop
from recent decisions. The goal of this analysis of recent developments is
promotion of uniformity in interpreting the U.A.A. and providing a framework
for analyzing similar cases.
1. This project was written and prepared by Journal of Dispute Resolution Members and
Candidates under the direction of Associate Editor in Chief Scott E. Blair and Note and Comment
Editor Cynthia C. Hardie.
2. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1-25, 7 U.L.A. 4 (1978) [hereinafter U.A.A.].
3. Jurisdictions which have adopted arbitration statutes patterned after the U.A.A. are Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.
4. See Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1991 J. DisP. RESOL. 417; Recent
Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1990 J. Disp. REsOL. 471; Recent Developments: The
Uniform Arbitration Act, 1989 J. DisP. RESOL. 237; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration
Act, 1988 J. DisP. RESOL. 247; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1987 Mo. J.
DiSP. RESOL. 177; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1986 Mo. J. DiSP. RESOL.
169; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1985 Mo. J. DisP. REsOL. 173; Recent
Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1984 Mo. J. DIsp. RESOL. 207; Recent Developments:
The Uniform Arbitration Act, 48 Mo. L. REv. 137 (1983).
5. This Article surveys cases decided between September 1990 and September 1991.
1
Cole et al.: Cole: Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
II. VALIDITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Section 1 of the U.A.A. provides that:
[a] written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration
or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any
controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable
and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.
6
The judiciary has been called upon to resolve a variety of issues arising
under this first section. Courts are being asked whether the parties intended to
submit their controversies to arbitration, whether the parties' actions constitute a
waiver of their arbitration agreement, whether the conditions precedent to the
agreement have been met, and whether arbitration agreements found in insurance
contracts are enforceable.
A. Intent to Submit Controversy to Arbitration
Determination of which issues are intended to be covered in an arbitration
agreement is an area where the courts show a preference for arbitrability. Unless
the language of the arbitration clause clearly states otherwise, courts will
generally find that the parties intended that the controversy be submitted to
arbitration.
In Johnson v. Baumgardt,7 the Appellate Court of Illinois stated that an
arbitration clause providing that all claims arising out of or "relating to" the
agreement are subject to arbitration is a generic arbitration clause.8 Therefore,
any dispute between the parties falls within that clause if the dispute arises out of
the subject matter of the contract and is, therefore, subject to arbitration.9
In another case interpreting Section 1 of the U.A.A., the Court of Appeals
of Texas held that an agreement to submit to arbitration all controversies arising
out of the contract may also encompass some tort claims." °  The court in
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Wilson" also held that the issue
of whether a valid arbitration agreement existed is separate from the issue of
whether the contract was repudiated or breached.'" The former issue is to be
6. U.A.A. § 1.
7. 576 N.E.2d 515 (II1. App. Ct. 1991).
8. Id. at 521.
9. Id.
10. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Wilson, 805 S.W.2d 38, 39 (Tex. Ct. App.
1991).
11. 805 S.W.2d 38.
12. Id. at 40.
[V/ol. 1992, No. 2
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decided by the trial court; the second is to be decided by arbitration.13 Since the
court in this case noted that fraud or misrepresentation was not averred, it sent
the case back to arbitration for further proceedings. 4
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania also exemplifies the liberal approach
courts take in deciding whether a claim should be decided in arbitration. 5 In
Erie Insurance Exchange v. Mason,'6 the parties' agreement stated that
"[d]isagreement over the legal rights to recover damages will be settled by
arbitration."'7 The court here held that a dispute over whether benefits were
available under an insurance contract was encompassed within the arbitration
agreement. 8
However, in Capital City Lodge 12 v. Harrisburg,9 another Pennsylvania
case, the court placed a caveat on application of the U.A.A..2°  The
Commonwealth Court found that under Pennsylvania law, the common law of
arbitration, not Pennsylvania's version of the U.A.A., applied to the arbitration
agreement. 2' The court's discussion of the issue can be read to suggest that the
U.A.A. did not apply because the parties' agreement did not specifically state that
the U.A.A. would control the parties' arbitration. 22
In Paine Webber, Inc. v. Hartmann,3 the Third Circuit affirmed the district
court's finding that parties may place a time limit on their obligation to
arbitrate. 24  The court stated that Rule 603 of the NYSE Department of
Arbitration Rules, if incorporated in an arbitration agreement, constituted a bar
to arbitration disputes raised more than six years after the events giving rise to
them, since parties to an arbitration agreement may place a time limit on their
obligation to arbitrate.25
Finally, in a case arising in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, plaintiffs
wanted to sue defendants in civil court but first had to overcome an agreement to
submit disputes to arbitration in Storey v. Shearson-American Express.26
Plaintiffs entered into two contracts with defendants, and, in the interim, an
amendment was enacted which required certain procedures to ensure arbitration
agreements were voluntary. 27 Plaintiffs argued that the amendments should be
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Erie Ins. Exch. v. Mason, 594 A.2d 741 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
16. 594 A.2d 741.
17. Id. at 741.
18. Id. at 743.
19. 588 A.2d 584 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
20. Id. at 587.
21. Id. n.7.
22. See id.
23. 921 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1990).
24. Id. at 511, 515.
25. Id. at 513.
26. 928 F.2d 159, 160 (5th Cir. 1991).
27. Id. nn. 1-2.
1992]
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applied retroactively.2 ' However, they did not allege that they would have acted
any differently with further knowledge. 29  Thus, the court held that the
amendment would not be applied retroactively, and did not support the plaintiffs'
attempt to avoid arbitration based on a technicality.3"
B. Waiver
Parties may also waive their right to arbitration.3 In Teerdsma v. Global
Steel Buildings, Inc. ,32 the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that arbitration
can be waived by conduct or activity inconsistent with the right to arbitrate if the
party claiming waiver can also show prejudice.33 In this case, Global Steel
requested arbitration after it had filed an answer to Tjeerdsma's complaint and
after it had engaged in "extensive pretrial discovery." I The court denied this
request and failed even to address the question of whether South Dakota's version
of the U.A.A. applied because the court found that Global Steel had waived its
right to arbitration.3"
C. Conditions Precedent
In order for an arbitration agreement to be valid, it must first be established
that the agreement is in writing and not revocable upon legal or equitable
contractual grounds.36
The Indiana Court of Appeals provides an example of the availability of
arbitration where a party fails to satisfy a condition precedent.37 In Freiburger
v. Bishop Dwenger High School,38 the Third District Court of Appeals of
Indiana held that an employee was not entitled to have her case remanded for
arbitration if the record did not show that she had availed herself of the
contractual conditions precedent to binding arbitration or that the employer
refused to arbitrate.39
In City of Blaine v. John Coleman Hayes,' the Tennessee Court of Appeals
addressed the issue of the ability to arbitrate recision claims when an arbitration
clause is included in the parties' contract. The court held that the arbitration
28. Id. at 161.
29. Id. at 162 n.4.
30. Id. at 161-62.
31. See generally 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 515(6) (1963).
32. 466 N.W.2d 643 (S.D. 1991).
33. Id. at 645.
34. Id. at 644.
35. Id. at 645.
36. See, e.g., TENN. CODE. ANN. § 29-5-302 (Supp. 1992).
37. See Freiburger v. Bishop Dwenger High Sch., 569 N.E.2d 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
38. 569 N.E.2d 755.
39. Id. at 759.
40. 818 S.W.2d 33 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
4
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clause of a contract did not apply to a recision claim brought by the city, and the
court reasoned that the city had been fraudulently induced to enter into the
contract.4 Tennessee's version of the U.A.A. establishes the validity of an
arbitration agreement, "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity. "42
The court found, contrary to the result reached by the United States Supreme
Court construing a similar statute in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co. ," that because of the long-established right to seek a recision
of a contract procured by fraud, the Tennessee legislature must have intended that
recision claims be excepted from arbitration."
In Anderson v. Federated Mutual Insurance Co.,45 the Court of Appeals of
Minnesota held that Minnesota's adoption of the U.A.A. superseded its common
law arbitration." Therefore, oral arbitration agreements are now unenforceable
under Minnesota law.47 Under the Minnesota U.A.A., the agreement must be
in writing as a condition precedent to its validity.4"
In Reicks v. Farmers Commodities Corp., the Supreme Court of Iowa
held that Reicks could not compel arbitration of a tort claim under Iowa's version
of the U.A.A.' The court so held because Iowa's version of Section 1 of the
U.A.A. contains an exemption for "any claim sounding in tort whether or not
involving a breach of contract. "s The court held, therefore, that the dispute
must be resolved under Iowa's common law of arbitration. 2
D. Insurance Contracts
Yet another important area where Section 1 of the U.A.A. has important
ramifications is in the area of insurance contracts. In Mutual Reinsurance Bureau
v. Great Plains Mutual Insurance Co.," the United States District Court for
Kansas found that a Kansas state law which invalidates arbitration agreements
contained in "contracts of insurance" was inapplicable.' The court reasoned
that because the agreement between Mutual Reinsurance Bureau and Great Plains
41. Id. at 38.
42. Id. at 37; see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-302.
43. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
44. John Coleman Hayes, 818 S.W.2d at 36-38.
45. 465 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
46. Id. at 70.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 72; see also MINN. CODE. ANN. § 572.08 (1988).
49. 474 N.W.2d 809 (Iowa 1991).
50. Id. at 810.; see IOWA CODE § 679A 1(2)(c) (1981).
51. Reicks, 474 N.W.2d at 810.
52. Id.
53. 750 F. Supp. 455 (D. Kan. 1990).
54. Id. at 461; see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401 (1991).
19921
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Mutual was a contract for reinsurance, rather than a contract of insurance the
arbitration agreement contained in the contract was valid and enforceable. 5
The Supreme Court of Delaware found that a portion of the parties'
arbitration agreement was void due to unconscionability 6  In Fritz v.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. , an unreported opinion, the plaintiff was a
party to an automobile insurance contract which required arbitration.58 Fritz was
a passenger in a vehicle driven by defendant's insured that was struck from
behind by an uninsured motorist. 9 Plaintiffs claims were covered under the
"uninsured motorist" provision in the insured's contract, thus making her a third-
party beneficiary.' Her claims were submitted to arbitration pursuant to the
compulsory clause in the contract.6 Fritz alleged the arbitration clause was void
as against public policy because the agreement could only be invoked by the
insurance company.
6 2
The court found that the arbitration mechanism was unfairly structured in
favor of the insurance company and rendered that portion void due to
unconscionability.63 However, the most important factor rendering the
arbitration portion of the contract unconscionable was that the insureds were
automatically bound by arbitration awards, but the company was only bound if it
consented in writing.'
Another case addressing uninsured motorists provisions is Worldwide
Insurance Group v. Klopp.6" The provision in question dictated that any awards
which exceeded state financial responsibility limits could be appealed by either
party to the contract;66 any award falling below the limits was not appealable.67
This provision operated in the insurer's favor because the company would likely
appeal an award higher than the policy limit while the insured party could not
appeal any award below the policy limit.6" The court ruled that the provision
promoted litigation and was void as against public policy.69
55. Mutual Reinsurance, 750 F. Supp. at 461.
56. Fritz v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 1369. 1990 WL 186448, at *4 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 26, 1990).
57. Civ. A. No. 1369, 1990 WL 186448.





63. Id. at *6.
64. Id.
65. 603 A.2d 788 (Del. 1992).
66. Id. at 789.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 790.
69. Id. at 791-92.
[Vol. 1992, No. 2
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In Warranty Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Lara,7 ° the Texas Court of
Appeals addressed the question of whether a court must compel arbitration where
the contract does not properly state that disputes arising out of the agreement are
subject to arbitration.71 The court held that it had no jurisdiction to compel
arbitration because the arbitration provision in the contract was unenforceable.72
When the parties entered the contract, Texas law required that contracts subject
to arbitration must state those terms either in typed, underlined capital letters or
by a stamped notice on the first page of the agreement.73 The insurance contract
in question did not meet the requirements, and the appellate court therefore had
no jurisdiction to compel arbitration because the arbitration clause was
unenforceable.' 4
In Meyer v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,7 the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals held that arbitration agreements or appraisal requirements in an
insurance contract of cohesion are valid and will be enforced by the Maryland
courts.76 Although insurance contracts are generally cohesive, the court held
that the terms of the agreement are not invalid or unenforceable.77
III. PROCEEDINGS TO COMPEL OR STAY ARBITRATION
When in conflict, the question of whether or not an agreement to arbitrate
actually exists is to be summarily decided by the court, according to the Meyer
court."8 If the court decides that a written arbitration agreement exists, the
U.A.A. states that the court "shall order the parties to proceed with
arbitration,"79 without considering the merits of the claim underlying the
arbitration agreement.8" If, on the other hand, the court finds that there is no
agreement to arbitrate, it may stay the arbitration proceeding. 8 The U.A.A.
also provides that an application to stay arbitration may be made to the court with
respect to those issues that are severable from the dispute being arbitrated.'
70. 805 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
71. See id. at 895.
72. Id. at 897.
73. Id. at 896.
74. Id. at 897.
75. 582 A.2d 275 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990).
76. Id. at 278.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. U.A.A. § 2(a) (emphasis in original).
80. Id. § 2(e).
81. Id. §2(b).
82. Id. § 2(d).
7
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A. Compel or Stay
The Arizona Court of Appeals faced the issue of whether a trial court's
order compelling arbitration under an Arizona statute similar to U.A.A. Section
2 is interlocutory and therefore not immediately appealable.83 In Dusold v.
Porta-John Corp.,' the plaintiff claimed injury resulting from'exposure to
chemicals supplied by defendant for the cleaning and servicing of portable
toilets.85 The chemicals had been supplied by defendant under a contract which
included a provision requiring arbitration of "any claim or controversy arising out
of, or relating to this agreement, or the breach thereof."86 The trial court
granted defendant's request to dismiss judicial proceedings and to compel
arbitration pursuant to Arizona Revised Statute Section 12-1502.' The appellate
court held that the trial court's order was a dismissal of the plaintiff's claims and
that the order to compel arbitration was a final judgment and, therefore, was
immediately appealable.88
An Illinois case in accord with Dusold is Robert A. Besner & Co. v. LIT
America, Inc.89 The court stated that an order of a circuit court granting a
motion to stay arbitration is immediately appealable as an interlocutory order
because it is injunctive in nature.' To comply with Illinois Supreme Court rules
governing interlocutory appeals, the appeal must be perfected within 30 days from
the entry of the order by filing a "Notice of Interlocutory Appeal."' In
addition, the court ruled that under Section 2 of the Illinois Arbitration Act' a
party was not entitled to a new application or hearing to determine whether an
agreement to arbitrate existed when, on motion to compel or stay arbitration, the
issue had already been decided.
3
In a result conflicting with Dusold, 94 the Court of Appeals of Colorado held
that an order compelling the parties to arbitrate is interlocutory in nature and not
immediately appealable. 5  In Associated Natural Gas, Inc. v. Nordic
Petroleums,9" the defendant filed a motion with the court to compel arbitration
83. Dusold v. Porta-John Corp., 807 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
84. 807 P.2d 526.
85. Id. at 527.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 529.
89. 574 N.E.2d 703 (111. App. Ct. 1991).
90. Id. at 705.
91. Id. (citing ILL. SUP. CT. R. 307(a)(1)).
92. Section 2 of the Illinois Arbitration Act is almost identical to Section 2 of the U.A.A.
Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, para. 102(a) (1987) with U.A.A. § 2.
93. RobertA. Besner & Co., 574 N.E.2d at 706.
94. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
95. Associated Natural Gas, Inc. v. Nordic Petroleums, 807 P.2d 1195, 1196 (Colo. Ct. App.
1990).
96. 807 P.2d 1195.
[Vol. 1992, No. 2
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pursuant to an arbitration clause in the parties' contract.9" The plaintiff then
filed a motion to stay arbitration pending an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether or not the arbitration clause applied to the parties' dispute.98 At the
defendant's request, the court determined that all issues between the parties were
subject to arbitration.99 The plaintiff asked for clarification of the court's order,
and the court determined that "its sole function in the dispute was to determine
whether [the contract between the parties] would permit arbitration. ""°  The
issues were submitted to arbitration, and the defendant appealed, contending that
the plaintiff waived its rights to clarification by requesting a stay of arbitration
and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to clarify its order relative to the scope
of the arbitration. 101
The court of appeals ruled that: (1) a party seeking a stay of arbitration
under the Colorado statute does not waive its rights to clarification of the issues
involved;"° and (2) an "order compelling parties to arbitrate is not appealable,
thus interlocutory in nature."1"3  Thus, the trial court retains its jurisdiction
prior to the commencement of the arbitration proceeding to resolve any issues
relative to the arbitration.'0 4
The issues presented in a Pennsylvania case, Baverso v. State Farm
Insurance Co.," were (1) whether a passenger in an automobile was the
"insured" as represented under an insurance agreement and (2) whether this issue
was arbitrable.'06 The court found that there was no limit on the types of issues
that could be decided by an arbitrator."17 The court also found that a trial court
could compel arbitration of any of these issues if both parties had agreed to
submit their difficulties to arbitration in the insurance agreement.l18
In a Nevada case, the issue facing the court was whether to compel
arbitration based on labor agreements.0 9 In Clark County Public Employee
97. Id. at 1196.
98. Id. Plaintiffs motion to stay arbitration was filed pursuant to COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-
204(2), which is similar in wording and effect to U.A.A. § 2(b). Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-
22-204(2) (1987) with U.A.A. § 2(b).
99. Associated Natural Gas, 807 P.2d at 1196. Although the reported decision of the court
makes no mention of it, the Colorado Uniform Arbitration Act contains a provision with language
identical to that of U.A.A. § 2(d), which allows the court to determine which issues are arbitrable and
which are severable from the arbitrable issues. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-204(4) (1987)
with U.A.A. §2(d).
100. Associated Natural Gas, 807 P.2d at 1196.
101. Id.
102. Id. The court based its reasoning on language found in COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-204(2).
See id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1197.
105. 595 A.2d 176 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
106. Id. at 177.
107. Id. at 178.
108. Id. at 178-79.
109. See Clark County Pub. Employee Ass'n v. Pearson, 798 P.2d 136 (Nev. 1990).
19921
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Ass'n v. Pearson,"' the nurses for the University Medical Center of Southern
Nevada were covered under a "clinical ladder program" by which nurses could
receive added proficiency pay for fulfilling certain proficiency requirements."'
In 1988, the hospital and the Clark County Public Employee Association entered
into a collective bargaining agreement which covered the nurses but did not
expressly address the clinical ladder program. Shortly thereafter, the hospital
terminated the clinical program." 3
The employee association filed a formal demand for arbitration to decide
whether the clinical program was incorporated into the collective bargaining
agreement and whether the hospital had failed to compensate nurses with
proficiency pay and reimbursement of expenses for activities undertaken pursuant
to the program;" 4 the hospital refused to arbitrate." 5  The Supreme Court of
Nevada stated that the Nevada courts resolve all doubts concerning arbitrability
of the subject matter of a dispute in favor of arbitration, "unless it may be said
with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. " '6 The court found that the
disputes were, at least, arguably specifically incorporated in tie collective
bargaining agreement and therefore ordered the dispute to arbitration.'
Another recent Pennsylvania case dealing with the level of compulsion
involved in arbitration is In re Glover."' This case, decided by the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, addressed the issue of whether a physical
education teacher's dismissal was arbitrable under the Public Employee Relations
Act of 1970 (PERA)." 9 The court ruled that (1) since PERA was silent on the
issue of who has the right to interpret whether a dispute arising under it is
arbitrable and (2) since Section 7304(b) of the Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration
Act expressly allows the trial court to decide the issue,12 the specific language
of the Pennsylvania U.A.A. controlled on the issue.'
12
In Batton v. Green, a Texas case arising out of a dispute regarding a
licensing agreement, the Texas Court of Appeals held that a denial of a motion
110. 798 P.2d 136.





116. Id. at 138 (quoting AT & T Technologies v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S.
643, 650 (1986)).
117. Id. at 142.
118. 587 A.2d 25 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
119. Id. at 26.
120. Id. at 27. The language of the Pennsylvania statute, while not identical, is nearly the same
as'the language of the U.A.A. § 2(b). Compare 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7304(b) (1982) with U.A.A.
§2(b).
121. Glover, 587 A.2d at 27.
122. 801 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
[Vol. 1992, No. 2
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to stay an action pending arbitration is not made appealable by the Texas
equivalent of U.A.A. Section 2."' The court held that an order granting an
application to stay arbitration is, however, made appealable by the statute." u
Also, the court held that the plaintiffs could not contend that the Texas statute
applicable to interlocutory orders interferes with the "liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements." 2  The statute specifically allows a party
insisting upon arbitration an interlocutory appeal from an order denying
arbitration or from an order granting an application to stay arbitration.
26
David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd. 12 7 is a Vermont case
in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled on the
issue of whether parties to a dispute may be compelled to arbitrate under the
Vermont arbitration statute similar to U.A.A. Section 2.128 The court ruled
that parties to a commercial dispute may not be compelled to submit the dispute
to arbitration unless they have contracted to do So, 129 but that if there is any
doubt about whether the parties actually had done so, federal policy greatly favors
the arbitration of any issues that are arbitrable.13 ° This policy is even stronger
in the context of international business, the court said, citing a need for business
to proceed as smoothly as possible.' 3 ' In those cases, there is a "presumption
of arbitrability. "132
In Champaign Police Benevolent & Protective Ass'n v. City of
Champaign,'33 a police officer and the police officers' association brought an
action to compel arbitration under the grievance procedure in a collective
bargaining agreement." 4 The court affirmed the lower court's determination
that the dispute was subject to arbitration, stating that the argument on the merits
of the dispute should not be a factor in the determination of the arbitrability of the
dispute. '3
123. Id. at 926.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 929.
126. Id.
127. 923 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1991).
128. Id. at 248.
129. Id. (citing Necchi S.p.A. v. Necchi Sewing Machine Sales Corp., 348 F.2d 693, 696 (2d
Cir. 1965)).




133. 569 N.E.2d 275 (11. App. Ct. 1991).
134. Id. at 276.
135. Id. at 278. But see John Coleman Hayes, 818 S.W.2d at 38 (deciding to take the minority
position and allowing the trial court to determine whether the arbitration clause and the contract were
procured by fraud before determining whether to compel or to stay arbitration).
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B. Waiver
In D.M. Ward Construction Co. v. Electric Corp.,136 the plaintiff in a
contract dispute filed a motion to compel arbitration under Kansas Statute 5-
402(a). "37  The court found that the plaintiff failed to file the motion until 10
months after the actual litigation of the claim had begun and at a time when
discovery was essentially complete.' 38 The court believed this tardy request for
arbitration greatly prejudiced the other party to the action and ruled that the
plaintiff had waived his right to compel arbitration.' 39
Similarly, a Delaware court in Wilshire Restaurant Group v. Ramada,
Inc., ' 40 an unreported opinion, stated that although there is a strong public
policy favoring arbitration, waiver may be found if the party seeking arbitration
has actively participated in a lawsuit or has taken other action inconsistent with
its right to arbitrate.' 4' The court found Wilshire waived any right to arbitrate
because it had abandoned its initial effort to seek arbitration, filed suit, and
participated in discovery, all without logical explanation. 4 '
IV. HEARING
Section 5 of the U.A.A. deals with the procedural aspects of an arbitration
proceeding.143 Section 5(a) governs the power of the arbitrator in serving notice
and choosing a forum.'" Section 5(b) provides parties to an arbitration
proceeding the right to present their evidence. 45  Finally, section 5(c) allows
the majority of arbitrators to decide an issue if an arbitrator "ceases to act. 1146
In Integrated Resources Equity Corp. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough,141
the appellant stated that the arbitrator engaged in ex parte activity because he
consulted with a third party and then improperly used this evidence at the
arbitration proceeding. 48 The court stated that it was not necessary to reach the
issue of the predjudical effect of the arbitrator's activity because the appellant
failed to object when the evidence was presented at the arbitration
136. 803 P.2d. 593 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990).
137. Id. at 596. The Kansas statute in question is substantially similar to U.A.A. § 2(a). See
id.
138. Id. at 595-97.
139. Id. at 597.
140. C.A. No. 11506, 1990 WL 195910 (Del. Ch. Dec. 5, 1990).
141. Id. at *2.
142. Id. at *4.
143. See U.A.A. § 5.
144. U.A.A. § 5(a).
145. U.A.A. § 5(b).
146. U.A.A. § 5(c).
147. 799 P.2d 295 (Alaska 1990).
148. Id. at 297-98.
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proceeding.149 This failure to object resulted in a waiver of the right to raise
the issue on appeal." The court noted if the proper objection had been made,
the arbitration panel could have remedied the situation.'
In International Ass 'n of Firefighters v. City of East St. Louis,5 2 the court
held that the city waived its right to seek arbitration under the U.A.A. when it
failed to object to the circuit court's interpretation of the agreement."'3
As the above cases indicate, it is important to follow the procedural rules in
an arbitration proceeding. As with a judicial proceeding, failure to follow these
rules may expose the parties to a different outcome than they expected.
V. CHANGE OF AWARD BY ARBITRATORS
Pursuant to Section 9 of the U.A.A. ,1" an arbitrator may change an award
to modify, to clarify, or to correct an existing award. This Section allows a party
to file for correction of an award within twenty days of the delivery.' 55 The
grounds for modification are miscalculation or mistake pursuant to Section
13.156 A party may also file for clarification of the existing award. 57  The
majority of cases which fall under this Section have been appealed and remanded
with orders for the arbitrator to clarify the award.'
In IBEW, Local 1547 v. City of Ketchikan, "'59 the city fired all of its full-
time telephone operators."W The operators were union members,' 6 ' and the
149. Id. at 298.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 299. The court was relying on an Alaska statute which permits an arbitration panel
to continue if "an arbitrator for any reason ceases to act." See Integrated Resources Equity Corp.,
799 P.2d at 299 n.3 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.050(3) (1983)).
152. 571 N.E.2d 1198 (I1. App. Ct. 1991).
153. Id. at 1202.
154. Section 9 of the U.A.A. concerns the change of award by arbitrators and provides:
On application of a party or, if an application to the court is pending under
Sections 11, 12, or 13, on submission to the arbitrators by the court under such
conditions as the court may order, the arbitrators may modify or correct the award upon
the grounds stated in paragraphs (1) and (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 13, or for the
purpose of clarifying the award. The application shall be made within twenty days after
delivery of the award to the applicant. Written notice thereof shall be given forthwith
to the opposing party, stating he must serve his objections thereto, if any, within ten days
from the notice. The award so modified or corrected is subject to the provisions of





158. See infra notes 159-84 and accompanying text.
159. 805 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1991).
160. Id. at 341.
161. Id. The operators were members of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
(IBEW). Id.
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union appealed to the arbitrator pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. "
The arbitrator ordered the city to reinstate the operators but did not state the
extent or duration of the operators' rights.'63 The city wanted the arbitrator to
clarify his award, but the union opposed clarification.'" Without both parties'
assent, the arbitrator had no power to clarify his award.'65  A declaratory
judgment entered a year later by the superior court interpreted the award as not
requiring reinstatement.'66 The union appealed this interpretation, and the case
was heard by the Supreme Court of Alaska.' 67 The supreme court noted that
the lower courts should not interpret arbitration awards.16 The Alaska Supreme
Court held that a lower court's role with respect to arbitration is only to discern
if the award is ambiguous or unclear.' 69 If either is true, then the issue should
be remanded to the arbitrator for clarification. 70
Similarly, the Maine Supreme Court held, in Maine State Employees Ass'
v. State Department of Corrections, 171 that an unclear arbitration award cannot
be enforced by the courts until the award is clarified by the arbitrator upon
remand.' 72 In this case, a state employee was terminated,' 73 and the union
moved to arbitrate pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.' The
arbitration award ordered that the employee be reinstated and receive payment for
full back-pay.'75 The trial court modified the award by adding the language
"with no offset for workers' compensation benefits. ,176 The supreme court held
that, although the original award was ambiguous, the trial court should have
remanded to the arbitrator for clarification instead of trying to interpret its
meaning. 177 Finally, the Maine Supreme Court remanded the case back to the
arbitrator for clarification.1
71
When a dispute erupted between lessee and lessor in Hearst Corp. v. Swiss







168. Id. at 343.
169. Id. & n.7.
170. Id. at 343.
171. 593 A.2d 650 (Me. 1991).
172. Id. at 653.
173. Id. at 651.
174. Id.
175. Id. The arbitrator specifically stated that the plaintiff should be "made whole" for losses
and expenses as well as lost earnings and benefits. Id.
176. Id. at 652.
177. Id. at 652-53.
178. Id. at 653.
179. 584 A.2d 655 (Me. 1991).
180. Id. at 656.
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the lessee's rights to lease its mineral rights to a third party. 1"' The original
award assigned only legal rights to the parties without mentioning monetary
rights."2 The lower court entered an award for damages to the lessee, and the
lessor appealed.' 83 The Maine Supreme Court ruled that the award was
incomplete and ambiguous and that it therefore could not be enforced until the
arbitrator clarified it on remand."
V1. CONFIRMATION OF AN AWARD
Public policy strongly favors the confirmation of arbitration awards. A court
will not overturn an arbitrator's decision "[a]s long as the arbitrator is even
arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of this
authority."185 Furthermore, an award will be confirmed unless grounds for
vacating"'6  or modifying"1  are presented within 90 days. 8  The
confirmation of arbitration awards is controlled by Section 11 of the U.A.A."'9
A. Discussion of Recent Cases
A court may confirm an arbitration award only if the award is "unambiguous
and enforceable by its terms.""9  In Maine State Employees Ass'n,"'1 an
arbitrator ordered that the employee "be made whole for all losses and expenses
incurred as a result of her improper termination."'" The trial court confirmed
the award and entered judgment entitling the employee to reinstatement and "back
pay with no offset for workers' compensation benefits. "' The Maine Supreme
Judicial Court held that the determination of whether an arbitration award contains
ambiguous language is a question of law for the trial court. 94 The court went
on to find the phrase "made whole" inherently ambiguous."' As a result, the
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 657.
184. Id. at 659.
185. Osceola County Rural Water Sys. v. Subsurfco, 914 F.2d 1072, 1075 (8th Cir. 1990).
186. U.A.A. § 12 (vacating an award).
187. U.A.A. § 13 (modification or correction of award).
188. U.A.A. § 11 (confirmation of an award) (referring to U.A.A. §§ 12-13).
189. U.A.A. § 11 provides: "Upon application of a party, the Court shall confirm an award,
unless within the time limits hereinafter imposed grounds are urged for vacating or modifying or
correcting the award, in which case the court shall proceed as provided in Sections 12 and 13."
U.A.A. § 11.
190. Maine State Employees Ass'n, 593 A.2d at 652.
191. 593 A.2d 650.
192. Id. at 651.
193. Id. at 651-52.
194. Id. at 653.
195. Id. The court also noted that the trial court's efforts to redefine the phrase "made whole"
confirmed its ambiguity. Id.
19921
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court remanded the case to the trial court and stated that an arbitration award
containing ambiguous language must be submitted to the arbitrator for clarification
before it can be confirmed.1
96
The standard of review of an arbitration award provides a difficult road for
parties attempting to have the arbitrator's decision overturned.' A court may
not overturn an arbitration award if the arbitrator acted within the scope of
authority and arguably applied the terms of the contract.' 98 However, in
Osceola County Rural Water System v. Subsurfco,'99 the district court vacated
an arbitration award.' The district court found that the arbitrators exceeded
their authority by ignoring the plain language of the contract and of Iowa case
law.2 °' In addition, the district court found that the arbitration award was
against public policy because the arbitrators ignored evidence. 2' On appeal,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and the arbitrator's award was
reinstated. 0 3  The appellate court stated that the district court erred by
substituting its interpretation of the contract for that of the arbitrators. 204  In
addition, the appellate court noted that arbitrators are not obligated to state the
reasoning behind an award.20 5 Therefore, the court held that the district court
erred in assuming that the arbitrators ignored evidence.0 6
Although courts are generally prohibited from reviewing the underlying
merits of an arbitration award,20 7 some exceptions have emerged. In Principal
Financial Group v. Allstate Insurance Co.," the trial court was asked to
confirm an arbitration award involving subrogation rights in a no-fault automobile
insurance dispute.2 9 The Minnesota Supreme Court has previously held that,
in no-fault insurance cases involving automobile reparation, arbiters are limited
196. Id. at 652.
197. See Osceola County Rural Water Sys., 914 F.2d at 1075.
198. Id.
199. 914 F.2d 1072.
200. Id. at 1075. The district court applied the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988
& Supp. 1990) (amended 1992), which is modeled after U.A.A. § 12. See Osceola County Rural
Water Sys., 914 F.2d at 1075. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, an arbitration award may be
vacated only under specific circumstances, such as when arbitrators refused to hear pertinent evidence
or when they "exceeded their powers." 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3)-(4).
201. Osceola County Rural Water Sys., 914 F.2d at 1074.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1075.
204. Id. The appellate court noted that the parties sought the arbitrator's interpretation of the
contract; the district court may not overturn the arbitration award just because its interpretation of the
contract is different. Id. (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363




208. 472 N.W.2d 338 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
209. Id. at 338.
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to finding issues of fact.210 Thus, the trial court first had to decide the issue
concerning subrogation rights under the no-fault act before it could determine
whether the arbiters acted within their authority.21' The appellate court here
stated that the trial court had jurisdiction to decide this issue.21 2
Under the U.A.A., a court must confirm an arbitration award unless an
action to modify, to correct, or to vacate the award is filed within 90 days after
the delivery of the award. 2 3  However, a problem can arise when arbitration
is authorized under a statute other than the U.A.A. Alaska's Public Employment
Relations Act 214 (PERA) requires disputes that have reached an impasse to be
submitted to arbitration when they involve public safety employees whose "service
may not be given up for the shortest time."2"' In State v. Public Safety
Employees Ass'n,216 the court was asked to confirm an award where arbitration
was authorized under PERA.2' 7 The Public Safety Employees Association
(PSEA) claimed that the State was precluded from challenging the arbitration
award because it failed to file an objection within 90 days.218 The Alaska
Supreme Court held that the U.A.A. 90-day time limit did not apply to arbitration
awards authorized under the PERA. 219  Although the PERA referred to a
section of the U.A.A. indicating the method for appointing arbitrators, the
legislature did not specifically state its desire to implicate the entire U.A.A.
221
Because the legislature failed to define a time limit or implicate the U.A.A's
limitations for challenging an arbitration award authorized under PERA, the
parties to the dispute are never immune from collateral attacks and are denied the
right to finality.221  As the supreme court noted, this issue demands legislative
222
action.
210. Id. at 340; see also Johnson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 426 N.W.2d 419, 421
(Minn. 1988).
211. Principal Financial Group, 472 N.W.2d at 340.
212. Id.
213. State v. Public Safety Employees Ass'n, 798 F.2d 1281, 1284 (Alaska 1990); see also
U.A.A. §§ 11-13.
214. ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.40.070-.260 (1972).
215. Public Safety Employees Ass'n, 798 P.2d at 1284 n.5; see also ALASKA STAT. §
23.40.200(b).
216. 798 P.2d 1281.
217. Id. at 1283-84.
218. Id. at 1284.
219. Id. at 1284-85.
220. Id. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200(b) refers to ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.030, which models
U.A.A. § 3 (appointment of arbitrators by the court). Compare ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.030 (1983)
with U.A.A. § 3.
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In Carlyle Joint Venture v. H.B. Zachry Co. ,223 the court confirmed an
arbitration award against a joint venture 24 and ordered enforcement against the
individual partners.225 The appellants claimed that the individual partners must
be parties to the arbitration before an award can be enforced against them.226
However, the court held that partners of a joint venture are individually and
severally liable for an award against the joint venture. 27
B. Conclusion
Under the U.A.A., courts have given great deference to arbitrators when
asked to confirm an arbitration award. Since it is the arbitrator's decision for
which the parties bargained, general principles preclude courts from clarifying
ambiguities in an award228 or reviewing the underlying issues.22 9  However,
some state statutes authorizing arbitration limit the arbitrator's authority in certain
situations21° or selectively incorporate the U.A.A. 2 3 1 In these cases, courts
must deviate from the general principles to fill the voids created by law.
VII. VACATION OF AWARDS
In certain limited circumstances, a court may grant judicial review of a case
decided by an arbitrator. Because of the deference courts give to the finality of
arbitration awards, a reviewing court is very limited in the scope of review of an
arbitration award. This deference is necessary in order to perpetuate arbitration
as an alternative form of dispute resolution. Section 12 of the U.A.A. addresses
the issue of when a court should confirm or vacate a decision by an
arbitrator. 232
223. 802 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
224. Id. at 816 ("A joint venture is a special combination of persons in the nature of a partnership




228. See Maine State Employees Ass'n, 593 A.2d at 652.
229. See Osceola County Rural Water Sys., 914 F.2d at 1075.
230. See Principal Fin. Group, 472 N.W.2d at 340.
231. See Public Safety Employees Ass'n, 798 P.2d at 1284.
232. Section 12 of the U.A.A. concerns vacating an award, and the section reads as follows:
(a) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where:
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or
corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party;
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause
being shown therefore or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or
otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section 5, as to
prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or
[Vol. 1992, No. 2
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A. Arbitrator's Scope of Authority
A court is empowered to set aside an award if it determines that the
arbitrator exceeded his power.23 Because of the goal of promoting alternative
dispute resolution, a reviewing court is extremely limited in its review of such
award.2 4
In City of Lenexa, Kansas v. C.L. Fairley Construction Co. ,23 the contract
stated that if a dispute arose between the parties, then the project engineer must
decide the dispute.236 If the parties disagreed with the project engineer's
decision, then they had 30 days to request arbitration. 237  In C.L. Farley, there
was disagreement over whether the request for arbitration was timely filed and
whether the court or an arbitrator should decide the issue." The court, relying
on persuasive authority from other jurisdictions, stated that whether a party has
complied with notice and time requirements of a contract are procedural matters
that are to be decided by an arbitrator, not the courts.2 3 9
prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely
determined in proceedings under Section 2 and the party did not participate in the
arbitration hearing without raising the objection; but the fact that the relief was such that
it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for
vacating or refusing to confirm the award.
(b) An application under this Section shall be made within ninety days after
delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant, except that, if predicated upon
corruption, fraud or other undue means, it shall be made within ninety days after such
grounds are known or should have been known.
(c) In vacating the award on grounds other than stated in clause (5) of
Subsection (a) the court may order a rehearing before new arbitrators chosen as provided
in the agreement, or in the absence thereof, by the court in accordance with Section 3,
or if the award is vacated on grounds set forth in clauses (3) and (4) of Subsection (a) the
court may order a rehearing before the arbitrators who made the award or their
successors appointed in accordance with Section 3. The time within which the agreement
requires the award to be made is applicable to the rehearing and commences from the
date of the order.
(d) If the application to vacate is denied and no motion to modify or correct the
award is pending, the court shall confirm the award.
U.A.A. § 12.
233. U.A.A. § 12(a)(3).
234. See Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 768 F.2d 180, 186 (7th Cir. 1985).
235. 805 P.2d 507 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991).
236. Id. at 508.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 509.
239. Id. at 510; see also Denhardt v. Trailways, Inc., 767 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1985); United
Nations Dev. Corp. v. Norkin, 380 N.E.2d 253 (N.Y. 1978); In re Saranac Lake, Inc., 546 N.Y.S.2d
713 (App. Div. 1989).
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In Baltimore Barn Builders v. Jacobs,' the issue was whether the
arbitrator exceeded his authority by awarding the plaintiff $1,550 rather than
$1,050, which was the amount of the plaintiffs final bill to defendant."' The
court stated that the party seeking to vacate an award has a heavy burden of proof
and must show by clear and convincing evidence that the arbitrator exceeded his
authority.1 2 The court stated that the defendant did not meet this burden and
that a mere allegation that the arbitrator awarded more than a claimant requested
is not grounds for vacating under the relevant Delaware statute.13 The court
also stated that if the arbitrator believed that a larger amount should be awarded
than originally sought, then it was within the arbitrator's authority to award the
higher amount.'
In Fort Wayne Education Ass'n v. Board of School Trustees,"5 the
arbitrator was found to have exceeded his authority when he determined an issue
that the master contract gave to the sole discretion of the school principal and
school board.24' The court stated that an award may be subject to collateral
attack when an arbitrator grants relief that is not permitted by public policy.
247
In Falcon Steel Co. v. HCB Contractors, Inc., 7 the arbitrator awarded
a lump sum to one of the parties without stating the rationale for the award."
The plaintiff then commenced an action to vacate the award pursuant to title 10,
section 5714(a)(3) of the Delaware Code. 2" The Delaware Arbitration Act '
is modeled after the Uniform Arbitration Act;2 52 however, Section 5714(a)(3)
is modeled after the Federal Arbitration Act. 53  Thus, the court looked to
federal cases for interpretation of this issue.2*4 The court reasoned that the
award provided an exact amount on its face and stated that it was in "full
240. Civ. A. No. 1424, 1990 WL 237094 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1990) (unreported opinion).
241. Id. at *2.
242. Id.
243. Id. The relevant statute was DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5714(a)(3) (1974).
244. Baltimore Barn Builders, 1990 WL 237094, at *3.
245. 569 N.E.2d 672 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
246. Id. at 680.
247. Id. at 678. The court stated that the arbitration of issues between a school and its employees
are limited by the Certified Educational Bargaining Act and the legislature expressed that the arbitrator
cannot prioritize certain contract provisions. Id. at 679.
248. Civ. A. No. 11557, 1991 WL 50139 (Del. Ch. April 4, 1991) (unreported opinion).
249. Id. at *1.
250. This statute states: "(a) upon complaint or application of a party in an existing case, the
court shall vacate an award where ... (3) The arbitrators exceeded their authority, or so imperfectly
executed them that a final and definitive award upon the subject matter was not made .... " DEL.
CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 5714(a)(3).
251. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5701-5725 (1974).
252. U.A.A. § 12(a)(3) states that an award may be vacated only where "[tthe arbitrators
exceeded their powers." U.A.A. § 12(a)(3).
253. See Falcon Steel, 1991 WL 50139, at *3. Compare 9 U.S.C. § 10(d) with DEL. CODE
ANN. § 5714(a)(3).
254. Falcon Steel, 1991 WL 50139, at *3.
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settlement of all claims submitted to this arbitration. "" The court further
found that the plaintiff did not dispute that the fact that the evidence on the claims
was not submitted to the arbitrator but disputed only that the award appeared not
to include its largest claim. 256  As a result, the court found that the plaintiff
failed to meet his burden of proof.
257
B. Tardiness of Arbitrator's Award
Section 8 of the U.A.A. provides that an award "shall be made within the
time fixed thereof by the agreement." 218  In Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Fisher,"9 a case of first impression in Illinois, an arbiter failed to make the
award within 30 days after the close of the arbitration proceedings as provided by
the terms of the insurance policy.' The plaintiff sought to vacate the award
based upon this misnomer. 26' The court stated that arbitration rules do not
fashion a remedy for failure of the arbitrator to submit the award in a timely
manner.262 Thus, the court looked to ordinary contract rules and found that in
the absence of a time-of-essence clause, the late filing of an award by an
arbitrator will not render the award invalid unless the objecting party can show
that it will somehow be prejudiced by the delay. 263  The court stated that a
contrary rule would deter individuals from becoming arbiters because of the
increased possibility of litigation against the arbiter." Furthermore, the court
stated that Illinois seeks to foster the arbitration process as an alternative means
of dispute resolution.2"
C. Vacation Based on Nonstatutory Grounds
Sometimes, a court will vacate an award based upon a reason not found in
the U.A.A. This often results when a award is found to be against public policy.
In Azpell v. Old Republic Insurance Co.,266 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the trial court's review of an arbitration award dealing with
uninsured motorist benefits was not within its scope of review. 267  The trial
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at *4.
258. U.A.A. § 8(b).
259. 571 N.E.2d 792 (Il. App. Ct. 1991).
260. Id. at 793.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 794.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 795.
265. Id.
266. 584 A.2d 950 (Pa. 1991).
267. Id. at 951.
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a modified version of the U.A.A.269 The court stated that a court should take
jurisdiction only when a claimant disputes an uninsured motorist clause as being
contrary to a "constitutional, legislative, or administrative mandate, or against
public policy or [when to award such would be] unconscionable."270 The court
found that there was no contract provision in dispute; only the award itself was
claimed to be against public policy.27" ' The court held that this is the type of
review the legislature intended to avoid when it adopted the U.A.A.
272
In Baith v. CNA Insurance Cos. ,273 a Pennsylvania trial court had applied
Section 7314(a)( 1)(i).274 The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial
court, which had vacated the arbiter's decision in an insurance dispute.275 In
this case, the insurer had withheld its consent to settle for the full policy limits,
had refused to tender to the insured party the settlement offer in order to protect
its subrogation rights, and then had defended against the insured's claim for
underinsured motorist benefits.276 The superior court held that the insurer's
conduct was a violation of the public policy of the state.
277
D. Refusal to Hear Evidence Material to the Controversy
A court is empowered to vacate an arbitration award if it can be shown that
the arbitrators "refused to hear evidence material to the controversy" or held the
arbitration proceeding in such a way as to prejudice substantially the rights of a
party to arbitration.278
Recent cases have addressed this issue. In Johnson v. Baumgardt, 79 the
issue was whether an arbitration award can be vacated where the arbiters excluded
evidence relevant to the defendant's defenses during the arbitration
proceeding.21 The court stated that an award cannot be vacated absent
statutory grounds for doing so. 28" ' The court also stated that errors of law or
fact are not sufficient grounds to vacate an award unless the mistakes appear on
269. See Azpell, 584 A.2d at 951. Section 7314(a)(1)(i) permits a court to vacate an arbitration
based on common law arbitration. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7314(a)(1)(i). Under Section
7341, a court may vacate an award only if the party was denied a hearing or if there is fraud,
misconduct, corruption, or other irregularity which caused an unjust award. See id. § 7341 (1982).
The U.A.A. version simply states that "a court shall vacate an award where (1) the award was
procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means .... " U.A.A. § 12(a)(1).
270. Azpell, 584 A.2d at 952.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. 593 A.2d 881 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
274. Id. at 882-83; see supra note 269 (discussing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7314(a)(1)(i)).
275. Id. at 885.
276. Id. at 882.
277. Id.
278. U.A.A. § 12(a)(4).
279. 576 N.E.2d 515 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
280. Id. at 518.
281. Id. at 519; see also Rauh v. Rockford Prods. Corp., 574 N.E.2d 636 (I11. 991).
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statutory grounds for doing so.28" ' The court also stated that errors of law or
fact are not sufficient grounds to vacate an award unless the mistakes appear on
the face of the award.282 The court found the alleged error at hand to be
apparent on the face of the award.283  Because the arbiters refused to hear
evidence which was related to the dispute, they did not make an award which
fully settled the dispute."z Therefore, under Section 1 12(a)(4), the court held
that a court can vacate the award.285
Generally, a court will not overturn an arbiter's decision. However,
occasionally a party may succeed in having an award overturned. If an award is
based on fraud, bias, corruption, failure to hear all relevant evidence, a ruling
contrary to public policy, or if the arbitrator exceeded his authority, then a court
will vacate such an award.
VIII. MODIFICATION OR CORRECTION OF AN AWARD
The U.A.A. gives a court authority to modify or to correct an arbitration
award with limited review.286 The modification or correction of an award is
controlled by Section 13 of the U.A.A.2" A court may modify or correct an
award containing an evident miscalculation or mistake.2s  In addition, a court
may correct an award with respect to issues not submitted to arbitration if the
correction will not affect the rest of the award. 289  Finally, a court may correct
281. Id. at 519; see also Rauh v. Rockford Prods. Corp., 574 N.E.2d 636 (I1. 1991).
282. Johnson, 576 N.E.2d at 519.
283. Id. The court relied on ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 10, para. 112(a)(4), which is identical to
U.A.A. § 12(a)(4). Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, para. 112(a)(4) (1989)with U.A.A. § 12(a)(4).
284. Johnson, 576 N.E.2d at 519.
285. Id.
286. U.A.A. § 13 (modification or correction of an award).
287. U.A.A. § 13 provides:
(a) Upon application made within ninety days after delivery of a copy of the
award to the applicant, the court shall modify or correct the award where:
(1) There was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake
in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award;
(2) The arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them and
the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues
submitted; or
(3) The award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits
of the controversy.
(b) If the application is granted, the court shall modify and correct the award so
as to effect its intent and shall confirm the award as so modified and corrected.
Otherwise, the court shall confirm the award as made.
(c) An application to modify or correct an award may be joined in the
alternative with an application to vacate the award.
U.A.A. § 13.
288. U.A.A. § 13(a)(1).
289. U.A.A. § 13(a)(2).
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an award imperfect in form without "affecting the merits of the controversy.""
In any case, the application for modification or correction must be made within
90 days of delivery of the award.29' The following recent cases address the
issue of modification* and correction of arbitral awards pursuant to U.A.A. Section
13.
A. Discussion of Recent Cases
In determining whether an arbitration award should be modified or corrected,
the scope of review is limited.2" A court should not rule on the underlying
issues of the case, but should rather limit its examination to determining whether
the award falls into one of the specific statutory provisions for modification or
correction.293 In Baltimore Barn Builders," the defendant sought to modify
an arbitration award based upon evidence of a miscalculation.295 The defendant
objected to an award for the sum of $1550 rather than the sum of $1050, which
reflected plaintiffs expenses.296  The court denied modification, stating that
defendant failed to meet the burden of proof.2" The court noted that the arbiter
had authority to grant a larger award than that which the plaintiff sought.29
A court may modify an arbitration award if it is necessary to correct "a
formal or jurisdictional deficiency" and if the modification will not affect the
merits of the dispute.299  In Maine State Employees Ass'n,' an arbiter
ordered that the employee "be made whole for all losses and expenses incurred
as a result of her improper termination. "0' The trial court confirmed the award
and entered judgment entitling employee to reinstatement and "back pay with no
offset for workers' compensation benefits. "I The appellate court found that
the trial court's interpretation of the arbitration award was a substantive
modification. 3 The test the appellate court applied is whether the additional
290. U.A.A. § 13(a)(3).
291. U.A.A. § 13(a).
292. Baltimore Barn Builders, 1990 WL 237094, at *1. See supra notes 240-44 and
accompanying text for discussion of the arbitrator's scope of authority in this case.
293. Baltimore Barn Builders, 1990 WL 237094, at *1.
294. Civ. A. No. 1424, 1990 WL 237094.
295. Id. at *3. The applicable Delaware statute provides in part for modification of an award
when "there was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the description of any
person, thing or property referred to in the award." Id. at *1 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §
5715(a)).
296. Id. at *2.
297. Id. at *3.
298. Id.
299. Maine State Employees Ass'n, 593 A.2d at 652.
300. 593 A.2d 650. See supra notes 171-78, 190-96 and accompanying text for further
discussion of this case.
301. Maine State Employees Ass'n, 593 A.2d at 651.
302. Id. at 651-52.
303. Id. at 653.
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judgment language affects the merits of the award.' Since it is the arbiter's
decision that the parties sought, a court may not modify the award but must
submit ambiguous awards to the arbiter for clarification."°5
A court may also modify an arbitration award if the arbitrator acted beyond
the scope of his authority and if the award can be corrected without affecting the
merits of the dispute.3"6  Fort Wayne Education Ass'n' presented two issues
concerning the ability of courts to find that an arbitrator exceed the scope of his
authority.
In Fort Wayne Education Ass 'n, a dispute concerning the reassignment of a
teacher was sent to arbitration.3 " In a motion to modify the arbitration award,
the Association tried to present evidence purporting that the arbitrator exceeded
the scope of his authority. 9 The trial court excluded the evidence stating that
"the pleadings and transcript . . . of the actual arbitration hearing, together with
the arbitrator's findings and award" are the proper evidence to be considered."'
On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed and stated that extrinsic
evidence is admissible for the purpose of showing that the arbiter exceeded his
scope of authority.3 ' However, the court did not find this to be reversible
error under the circumstances of the case.3"2
The Association also sought to have the language concerning the
prioritization of factors and reassignment to be excised from the arbitration
award. 313  Indiana's Certified Educational Employee Bargaining Act314
expressly forbids an arbitrator from prioritizing contract provisions.3"' In
addition, the contract in question delegated to the principal and the school board
the discretion to consider and prioritize factors in its assignment of the
faculty. 3 6  Thus, the Indiana Court of Appeals found that the arbitrator
exceeded the scope of his authority by stating that the "building needs outweigh
304. Id. at 652.
305. Id. at 652-53.
306. U.A.A. § 13(a)(2).
307. 569 N.E.2d 672.
308. Id. at 673.
309. Id. at 676. The Association submitted to the trial court transcriptions of the opening and
closing arguments made from tape recordings of the hearings, copies of the post-arbitration hearing
briefs, and an affidavit of an eyewitness authenticating the documents. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 677.
313. Id. at 678. Although the contract in this situation expired by the time the case reached the
appellate court and thus raised a moot point, the court decided to rule on this issue, citing public
concern that violations of statutes concerning collective bargaining in the education system would be
detrimental to the system. Id. at 675 n.1.
314. IND. CODE §§ 20-7.5-1-1 to 20-7.5-1-14 (1992).
315. Fort Wayne Educ. Ass'n, 569 N.E.2d at 679.
316. Id. at 678-79. The contract also stated that "the arbitrator shall have no authority to add
to, subtract from or modify the terms of the Master Contract." Id. at 678.
1992]
25
Cole et al.: Cole: Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
seniority.""' Furthermore, the court found that this language could be excised
without affecting the merits of the dispute.31 On this issue, the court reversed
and remanded with instructions for the trial court to excise this language.3"9
Jarosz v. Principal Financial Group,2 an unpublished Minnesota Court
of Appeals opinion, presents another example where a court was asked to modify
an arbitration award when the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority.
Under the U.A.A., an arbitrator may modify an arbitration award when the
arbitrator decides issues that were not properly submitted to arbitration if the
award can be modified without affecting the merits of the dispute.32" ' In Jarosz,
the arbitrator issued an award for medical expense benefits and stated that the
insurer "shall have no further obligation for future chiropractic care. 3 22 Under
Minnesota law, the plaintiff was only entitled to recover past medical expenses,
and the insurer was under no obligation to pay until the expenses were
incurred.32 3 By relieving the insurer of the obligation to pay future medical
expenses, the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority." The appellate
court held that the arbitration award could be modified by deleting the portion of
the award relating to the obligation to pay future medical expenses without
affecting the merits of the case. 3" In addition, the court found that the
arbitration award did not provide for interest payments as required by Minnesota
law. 326 However, the court refused to modify the award in order to account for
interest payments because it was unable to determine what the arbitrator intended
without further speculation.327
The Maryland courts addressed the issue of modification and correction of
awards in the area of medical malpractice.3 28  In Central Collection v.
Gettes,3" the State of Maryland brought an action seeking to recover arbitration
costs from the defendant. 3" In a medical malpractice case pursuant to the
Maryland Health Care Malpractice Claims Act,33' the arbitration panel found
in favor of the defendant and ordered that the costs of arbitration be split between
317. Id. at 680.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. C07-90-2409, 1991 WL 70303 (Minn. Ct. App. May 7, 1991).
321. Id. at *1 (citing MINN. STAT. § 572.20, subd. 1(2) (1990)); see also U.A.A. § 13(a)(2).
322. Jarosz, 1991 WL 70303, at *1 (quoting the arbitration award).
323. Id. at *2 (citing MINN. STAT. § 65B.44, subd. 1 (1990)).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 65B.54, subd. 2 (1990) (requiring interest to be paid on overdue
payments); see also MINN. STAT. § 65B.54, subd. 1 (1990) (stating that payments are overdue if not
paid within 30 days after the insurer receives proof of loss).
327. Jarosz, 1991 WL 70303, at *2.
328. See Central Collection v. Gettes, 584 A.2d 689, 693 (Md. 1991).
329. 584 A.2d 689.
330. Id. at 690.
331. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
[Vol. 1992, No. 2
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the claimant and the defendant.332 The claimant brought a timely action to
vacate the arbitration award.333 The case was presented to a jury, which
returned a verdict in favor of the defendant with a judgment for costs.3 4 Eight
years later, the State of Maryland brought an action seeking arbitration costs from
the defendant.333 The defendant claimed that the verdict award "for costs of the
law suit" reallocated the arbitration costs so that the claimant was responsible for
the full costs.336 The circuit court ruled in favor of the defendant, stating that
the State of Maryland should not be allowed to bring an action after so many
years.337 In effect, the circuit court reallocated the costs detailed in the
arbitration award.338
On appeal, the court recognized that the statute of limitations and laches does
not apply to a state suing in its sovereign capacity in its own court system.339
The appellate court also noted that the standard of review of arbitration awards
is narrow and that modification is available only in limited situations specified by
statute. 4 Essentially, these grounds are "limited to corruption, miscalculation,
or exceeding the arbitrator's authority."'" Furthermore, the appellate court
stated that review and modification of arbitration awards require judicial
determination and cannot be submitted to the jury. 42  The court continued,
holding that an arbitration award for the cost of arbitration should be treated
separately from the determination of the merits of the claim. 33
As a result, the jury's allocation of costs of the lawsuit did not act as a
modification of the arbitration award.' In addition, the defendant waived the
right to object to the award of arbitration costs by failing to file grounds for
vacating or modifying the arbitration award within the appropriate time
period. 3"
The concurrence objected to the majority's premise that an arbitration award
for costs should be treated individually from the arbitration award for the
underlying claim." The concurrence continued, rejecting the statutory




336. Id. at 691.
337. Id. at 690-91.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 691.
340. Id. at 693; see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-223 & 3-224 (1989).




345. Id. at 696.
346. Id. at 697 (Chasanow, 1., concurring).
19921
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Under the U.A.A, a court's ability to modify an arbitration award is very.
limited. A court may modify an award only in specific situations detailed by
statute and when the modification will not affect the underlying merits of the
arbitration award. 348 This limited review emphasizes the deference given to
arbitrators by respecting the parties' desire to have their dispute resolved through
arbitration. However, this restriction severely limits a court's ability to correct
an arbitration award that is inequitable.34'
IX. JUDGMENT OR DECREE ON AWARD
The U.A.A. provides that all judgments or decrees entered by the court be
in conformity with the arbitrator's ruling. 31 U.A.A. Section 14 states that
"upon the granting of an order confirming, modifying or correcting an award,
judgment or decree shall be entered in conformity therewith and be enforced as
any other judgment or decree. "35'
According to the Maine Supreme Court in Hearst Corp. v. Swiss Bank
Corp.,352 "an arbitration award must provide the basis for an enforceable
judgment under Section 5940 of the Act. "353  This requires the award to be
"sufficiently clear and definite" to be enforceable.3" Similarly, the court in
Sargent v. Town of Millinocke355 held that an arbitration decision must be
unambiguous to be enforceable.356
In Hearst Corp., a lessor (Hearst Corporation) and lessee (St. Raymond)
agreed to arbitration after a dispute arose concerning the lessor's leasing mineral
rights to a third party. 3 7 However, the arbitrator failed to specify a monetary
347. Id. at 699-700. The concurrence expressed the concern that a court should be able to review
arbitration awards that may have been decided arbitrarily or based upon factors such as ability to pay
or insurance coverage. Id.
348. U.A.A. § 13.
349. See Central Collection, 584 A.2d at 693.
350. U.A.A. § 14.
351. Id.
352. 584 A.2d 655 (Me. 1991).
353. Id. at 658; see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5840 (West 1980). Maine's statutory
provision Section 5940 is identical to U.A.A. Section 14. Compare MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 5940 with U.A.A. § 14.
354. Hearst Corp., 584 A.2d at 658 (quoting Lisbon School Comm. v. Lisbon Educ. Ass'n, 438
A.2d 239, 245 (Me. 1981)).
355. 478 A.2d 683 (Me. 1984).
356. Id. at 686.
357. Hearst Corp., 584 A.2d at 656.
[Vol. 1992, No. 2
28
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1992, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1992/iss2/8
UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT
award to the injured party, St. Raymond, as required in the arbitration
agreement.3"' The court held that this did not provide the standard of clarity
and definiteness necessary for the lower court to confirm and to enter
judgment.3"9 Therefore, when the court granted monetary benefits to St.
Raymond in its judgment, it was not in conformity with the arbitrator's award as
required under Maine's Arbitration Act, 3" and the Maine Supreme Court
remanded for clarification.36" '
The Supreme Court of Maine again addressed the issue of a court granting
an order confirming an arbitrator's ambiguous award.362 In Maine State
Employees Ass'n, 63 the arbitrator ruled in favor of a union employee who,
while employed at the Maine State Prison, suffered a work-related injury and was
later terminated in violation of the collective bargaining agreement.3  The
court held the arbitrator's award ambiguous because the award contained the
phrase shall be "made whole" in regard to all losses and expenses she incurred,
as well as lost earnings she suffered.363 However, the award was unclear
whether workers' compensation benefits were to offset the backpay she was to
receive for her improper termination.366 Therefore, when the lower court
interpreted the phrase "made whole" not to include offsetting backpay, it was
error because the term was ambiguous and thus was not in conformity with the
arbitration award.36
Thus, for judgment to be in conformity with the award, the court cannot
place its own interpretation on terms in the arbitration decision. The arbitrator
must insure that its award is clear and definite for the court to grant judgment.
At issue in Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.36 is whether an
arbitrator granting equitable relief may have this remedy enforced by state courts.
A recent Pennsylvania court, interpreting the 1927 Pennsylvania Arbitration
Act,369 held that a court could not enforce injunctive relief declared by an
arbitrator because the Act only allowed for enforcement of judgments.37 °
358. Id. at 658.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 659.
361. Id. The court noted "the statutory remedy prescribed by the Uniform Arbitration Act for
such an ambiguous award would normally have been either an application for clarification under
Section 5937 of the Act [U.A.A. Section 11] or a motion to vacate and a request for rehearing under
Section 5938 of the Act [U.A.A. Section 12J." id. at 657-58. However, neither party in Hearst
sought such remedies. Id. at 658.
362. See Maine State Employees Ass'n, 593 A.2d at 650.
363. 593 A.2d 650. See supra notes 171-78, 190-96 and accompanying text for further
discussion of the case.
364. Maine State Employees Ass'n, 593 A.2d at 651.
365. Id. at 653.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. 596 A.2d 860 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
369. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 161-181 (1927) (repealed 1980).
370. Dover v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 465 A.2d 644, 648-49 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
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However, with the adoption of the U. A.A. in 1980, the Pennsylvania courts may
now "enforce the ruling of an arbitrator, by entering either a judgment or decree
in conformity with the arbitrator's holding." 3 ' Thus, according to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the arbitral forum is appropriate for deciding issues
of equity. 
372
The Dickler court not only looked at both state and federal law but also at
the arbitration agreement itself to determine if the scope of the agreement
encompassed equitable relief.373 Since the court found no such prohibition
expressly stated in the agreement, and the intent of the parties was unclear, the
court held arbitration encompassing equitable relief proper.37 4
X. JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is governed by Section 17 of the U.A.A. According to Section
17, "the making of an agreement described in section 1 [of the U.A.A.I providing
for arbitration in this State confers jurisdiction on the court to enforce the
agreement under this Act and to enter judgment on an award thereunder. ,37
In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Cetus Corp.,376 Kodak was seeking injunctive
relief to prevent Cetus from transferring or disclosing certain technologies the two
companies had developed in a joint research and development effort.377 The
defendant Cetus "argue[d] that this Court lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction
because Delaware's arbitration statute [did] not apply to arbitrations pending in
other jurisdictions. ""' The Court of Chancery of Delaware rejected Cetus'
argument, holding that Kodak's claim for injunctive relief was within the court's
subject matter jurisdiction.379
The court based its reasoning on the fundamental power of a court of
chancery to provide injunctive relief to prevent irreparable harm.3"' The court
stated that, even though the power of the court with respect to compelling
arbitration may be limited,38' "it does not necessarily follow that this Court
lack[s] jurisdiction to enter an injunction in aid of a foreign arbitration.




375. U.A.A. § 17.
376. Civ. A. No. 12249, 1991 WL 202184 (Del. Ch. Oct. 4, 1991) (unreported opinion).
377. Id. at *1. The parties were engaged in arbitration in California when Kodak sought relief
in the court of Chancery. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id. at *2.
381. See U.A.A. § 17 (conferring jurisdiction to arbitration occurring "in this State").
382. Eastman Kodak, 1991 WL 202184, at *2.
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The court focused on the power of Chancery (both in England, as well as the
colonies) at the time of the American Revolution to confer equitable relief.3"3
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals also addressed the jurisdiction of the
court in an arbitration proceeding in Marousek v. Sapra.3" In Marousek, there
was a dispute as to whether it was the court or the Health Claims Arbitration
Board which had jurisdiction to rule on a motion for reconsideration.3"5 The
Marousek court held that jurisdiction is not yet granted to the court where the
Health Claims Arbitration Board has not completed its initial work." 6 The
court stated "there can be no review until all of the actions required of the first
tribunal have been taken."3" Thus, "until the arbitration panel has issued a
final award, there is nothing for the circuit court to review."388
XI. APPEALS
The U.A.A. provides an appeal process whereby an appeal may be taken
from an order: (1) denying an application to compel arbitration; (2) granting an
application to stay arbitration; (3) confirming or denying confirmation of an
award; (4) modifying an award; (5) vacating an award without directing a
rehearing; or (6) of judgment of decree entered.389
In Maine Department of Transportation v. Maine State Employees Ass 'n,3"
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that an appeal cannot be taken to a
court of law from an arbitration award without an intervening action by a court
of law.39' An appeal is allowed only after an order, judgment, or decree has
been entered by a court of law. 3" The court also held that a court order
vacating an original arbitration award and remanding the case for a rehearing is
not immediately appealable but is reviewable only after the second arbitration.393
The Pennsylvania courts have also recently addressed the issue of the
appealability of arbitration awards. In Kester v. Erie Insurance Exchange,
394
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that when there is an agreement to
arbitrate according to the provisions of the U.A.A., a court order denying a
judgment on the pleadings and referring the matter to arbitration is final and
appealable.395
383. Id.
384. 589 A.2d 529 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
385. Id. at 532.
386. Id. at 533.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. U.A.A. § 19.
390. 581 A.2d 813 (Me. 1990).
391. Id. at 814.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 814-15.
394. 582 A.2d 17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
395. Id. at 19.
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In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hughes,396 the Texas
Court of Appeals held that the Federal Arbitration Act does not provide
authorization for an interlocutory appeal from a state court order denying a
motion to stay or compel arbitration brought under the federal act. 3" Stating









396. 809 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. Ct, App. 1991).
397. Id. at 680.
398. Id. at 681.
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